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ARTICLE

MANAGING EXPECTATIONS:
DOES THE DIRECTORS’ DUTY TO MONITOR
PROMISE MORE THAN IT CAN DELIVER?
LISA M. FAIRFAX*
This article grapples with whether we are expecting too much from the
duty of oversight.1 The directors’ oversight duty refers to directors’ responsibility to actively monitor corporate officers, employees, and corporate affairs.2 Directors breach their oversight duty when officers and employees
engage in wrongdoing that causes harm to the corporation and that wrongdoing can be attributed to directors’ failure to monitor.3 In other words,
oversight liability holds directors liable for their failure to act under circumstances where it can be proven that directors should have acted and their
actions could have prevented corporate harm.4
The significance of directors’ oversight duty has grown at least in part
because it better captures the role directors play in the modern corporation.
While it is true that directors can have both a managerial role and a monitoring role over corporate affairs,5 most directors of today’s public corpora* Leroy Sorenson Merrifield Research Professor of Law, George Washington University
Law School. Special thanks to Wulf Kaal and Brett McDonnell for their insightful comments on
earlier versions of this draft, as well as Joel Nichols, Lyman Johnson, and the members of the St.
Thomas Law Review for their assistance on this article. All errors, of course, are mine.
1. The duty of oversight is also referred to as the duty to monitor. While this paper will use
those terms interchangeably, it will primary refer to the monitoring duty as the duty of oversight
since the Delaware case law most often describes the duty as oversight. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (defining the necessary conditions
for “director oversight” liability).
2. See id.; see also H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director’s Compliance Oversight
Responsibility in the Post Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 14 (2001) (“[D]irectors have an
obligation to see that the corporation’s affairs are properly managed.”).
3. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (referring to oversight liability as the failure to act in the face
of a known duty to act).
4. See id. at 370; In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch.
1996).
5. See generally Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
783, 790–805 (2011) (discussing boards as monitors and managers); Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards of Directors, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 781 (2003) (discussing the
different roles that boards of directors play, including managing and monitoring); Jill E. Fisch,
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tions are not primarily responsible for managing the day-to-day affairs of
the corporation.6 Instead, directors entrust officers and employees with
managing the corporate enterprise, and thus are primarily tasked with monitoring officers and employees to ensure that they manage in the corporation’s best interests.7 The responsibilities directors undertake when carrying
out this monitoring role often implicate the oversight duty.
The significance of directors’ oversight duty took center stage during
the 2007 financial crisis. Commentators agree that one of the primary
causes of the financial crisis was that banks and other entities took on too
much risk.8 As a corollary, commentators complained that directors failed
to monitor officers and employees to ensure that they were not engaging in
overly risky or fraudulent transactions.9 The corporate governance crisis of
2002, involving Enron and other corporate giants, drew similar complaints
that directors had failed to properly monitor the accounting practices within
such corporations.10 Few have suggested that directors’ more robust adherence to their responsibilities could have completely prevented either the
2007 financial crisis or the 2002 governance crisis. However, both crises
raised important questions regarding whether corporate malfeasance and its
resulting damage could at least have been minimized if directors had taken
more seriously their responsibility to actively oversee corporate affairs—
that is, if directors had not been “asleep at the switch.” In other words, these
Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 268–75 (1997) (discussing the development
of the monitoring board and its competing conception—the managerial board).
6. See The Corporate Laws Committee, ABA Section of Business Law, Corporate Director’s Guidebook—Sixth Edition, 66 BUS. LAW. 975, 985 (2011) (“[The board] typically delegates
responsibility for day-to-day operations to a team of professional managers.”); Michelle M. Harner, Corporate Control and the Need for Meaningful Board Accountability, 94 MINN. L. REV. 541,
551 (2010) (“The board of directors routinely delegates the day-to-day operations of the corporation to senior management.”).
7. See Corporate Director’s Guidebook—Sixth Edition, supra note 6, at 985.
8. Robert T. Miller, The Board’s Duty to Monitor Risk After Citigroup, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
1153, 1153 (2010) [hereinafter Miller, Board’s Duty]; accord Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-Management Failures at Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 50 (2010) [hereinafter Miller, Oversight Liability]; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay,
98 GEO. L.J. 247, 249 (2009); see also Martin Petrin, Assessing Delaware’s Oversight Jurisprudence: A Policy and Theory Perspective, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 433, 436 (2011) (“[B]oard passivity in oversight and, specifically, risk management programs is often viewed as one of the crisis’s
contributing elements.”). See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk
Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 970 (2009) (describing risk management failures during the
financial crisis).
9. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 971–72 (describing risk management failures
during the 2008–2009 financial crisis); Petrin, supra note 8, at 437 (“[B]oard passivity in oversight and, specifically, risk management programs is often viewed as one of the crisis’s contributing elements.”); Miller, Board’s Duty, supra note 8, at 1154–55 (suggesting that stricter
enforcement of the board’s duty to monitor risk may limit corporate risk-taking).
10. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Form Over Substance?: Officer Certification and the Promise of
Enhanced Personal Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 12–13
(2002); see also Janet E. Kerr, Developments in Corporate Governance: The Duty of Good Faith
and Its Impact on Director Conduct, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1037, 1039 (2006) (citing criticisms
of corporate culture including the failure to exercise adequate oversight).
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crises suggested that better outcomes could have resulted if directors had
complied more robustly with their fiduciary duty of oversight.
As a consequence, regulators and corporate governance experts have
come to view the shoring up of directors’ oversight role as critical to ensuring better corporate governance, and preventing corporate misconduct.11 Of
course, no one expects that enhancing directors’ oversight role will eradicate corporate misdeeds. However, there is a belief that such an enhancement will reduce instances of abuse. Hence, there appears to be a growing
desire to make the oversight role more robust to ensure that directors pay
greater attention to their monitoring responsibilities so that they can be
more informed regarding what is occurring within the corporation, better
prepared to respond to those occurrences, and better equipped to prevent
inappropriate conduct.
While this article agrees that directors must take their monitoring role
more seriously, it nevertheless questions whether reliance on oversight offers false hope for those seeking to enhance corporate governance and prevent corporate misconduct for several reasons. First, the oversight doctrine
may be too immature and incoherent, undermining the extent to which it
can provide meaningful guidance for directors seeking to comply with the
oversight duty. Second, the nearly insurmountable standard for imposing
liability for oversight breaches at best may render the doctrine irrelevant for
purposes of encouraging appropriate director behavior, and at worst may
undermine the extent to which directors feel compelled to take their oversight role seriously. Third, even if such a compulsion exists, the size and
complexity of the modern corporation may make it impractical for directors
to successfully engage in oversight. Finally, the nature of directors’ role in
the public corporation, as outsiders serving part-time, may make it unreasonable to expect that directors have the expertise, knowledge, or capacity
to effectively monitor the business affairs of large, and increasingly complex corporations. In this respect, efforts at enhancing oversight may be
doomed to failure, suggesting that it may be ill-advised to fixate on invigorating oversight as a means for enhancing corporate governance, or otherwise preventing the next corporate crisis.
Part I discusses the evolution of the oversight doctrine and its significance to corporate crises. Part II examines the manner in which Delaware
courts’ interpretation of the oversight doctrine may undermine its ability to
encourage directors to more effectively comply with their oversight responsibilities. Part III analyzes the manner in which the nature of the modern
corporation, as well as the current expectations regarding directors’ roles
within the corporation, may undermine the feasibility of a robust oversight
11. See Miller, Board’s Duty, supra note 8, at 1154–55; Petrin, supra note 8, at 436–37; see
also Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 972 (citing a survey wherein CFOs reported plans to investigate
their risk management practices).
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doctrine. Part IV concludes by assessing the impact of the shortcomings
associated with the oversight doctrine.
I. OVERSIGHT

AND THE

FINANCIAL CRISIS

A director’s oversight duty represents the duty to monitor and pay attention to corporate affairs.12 This means that oversight liability arises as a
result of inaction, as opposed to director conduct or decision-making. Oversight liability is imposed when director inattention can be viewed as allowing or failing to prevent misconduct that results in harm to the
corporation.13 Oversight raises the question: when will a director’s failure
to act lead to liability? This section discusses oversight, its evolution, its
increased importance to the modern corporation, and the oversight issues
that emerge during large scale corporate crises.
A. The Growing Significance of Oversight to Directors’ Role in the
Modern Corporation
Fiduciary duty law has traditionally focused on two duties: the duty of
care and the duty of loyalty.14 The duty of care focuses on the attentiveness
directors must have when making decisions.15 Pursuant to the duty of care,
directors are required to take actions in the best interests of the corporation,
which essentially means that directors must make decisions only after being
reasonably informed about the issues relevant to those decisions.16 Traditionally, the duty of loyalty addressed situations in which directors had a
conflict of interest or there was potential self-dealing by a director.17 The
duty of loyalty seeks to ensure that in those situations, directors do not
place their own interests before the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders.18 Both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty should guide
directors’ behavior when they are taking some action.
By contrast, the oversight duty addresses directors’ responsibility for
their inaction.19 That is, it seeks to assess whether, and under what circum12. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
13. See id.
14. See Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are there in Corporate Law?, 83 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1232–33 (2010) (noting that historically there were two main duties in corporate law: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty).
15. See Corporate Director’s Guidebook—Sixth Edition, supra note 6, at 990; see also Smith
v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (finding board of directors liable for breach of
duty of care where the board engages in conduct that is grossly negligent).
16. See Corporate Director’s Guidebook—Sixth Edition, supra note 6, at 990.
17. See id. at 992–93; see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 363 (Del.
1993) (outlining a two-part test for director’s self-interest); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812
(Del. 1984) (explaining that the business judgment rule does not protect self-dealing directors);
Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 981 (describing Scott D. Sullivan’s self-dealing that led to
WorldCom’s failure).
18. See Corporate Director’s Guidebook—Sixth Edition, supra note 6, at 992.
19. Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
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stances, directors can be held liable when actions taken by employees or
officers result in liability.20
Directors’ oversight duty has received renewed attention precisely because it best captures the nature of directors’ role in the modern corporation. A director’s role in the corporation encompasses both a monitoring
responsibility as well as a managerial role in which directors make specific
decisions regarding corporate affairs.21 On the one hand, directors only
make decisions regarding discrete transactions, such as mergers and other
fundamental matters that occur a few times during the life cycle of a corporation. On the other hand, as corporations have become larger and more
complex, directors’ monitoring roles have eclipsed their managerial roles.
This is because directors delegate the active management to officers, but
retain the responsibility to monitor and oversee those officers to ensure that
their management is consistent with the corporation’s best interests.22 The
increased emphasis on director independence has encouraged and facilitated
the shift towards monitoring because the vast majority of public company
directors do not hold employment positions within the corporation. As a
result, they are less likely to be engaged with the day-to-day operations of
the corporation.23 This shift towards boards-as-monitors not only means
that modern directors have primarily taken on the role of monitors, but also
means that the oversight doctrine is increasingly more relevant to directors’
roles within the corporation. Consequently, in many cases when corporate
decisions result in loss, directors are not likely to be involved in such decisions.24 To the extent directors conduct can be deemed blameworthy, that
conduct centers around their failure to properly monitor. Thus, assessments
regarding the contours of the oversight role—and when liability attaches in
that role—have grown in significance for modern corporations.

20. See id.
21. See Fisch, supra note 5, at 272 (“The duties of the managing board include advising the
CEO, participating in strategic planning, and reviewing the structure of significant corporate
transactions.”).
22. See id. at 269–70 (“[D]irectors have an affirmative obligation to monitor a corporation’s
compliance efforts.”).
23. See Corporate Director’s Guidebook—Sixth Edition, supra note 6, at 985; see also Alces,
supra note 5, at 790 (“[O]fficers control the day-to-day business of the company.”); Harner, supra
note 6, at 551 (explaining that the board typically does not control day-to-day operations but
rather directs the corporation’s business affairs).
24. See In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(noting that most decisions made within the corporation are not the subject of director action); see
also E. Norman Veasey & Julie M. Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised Model Act,
the Trans Union Case, and the Ali Project—A Strange Porridge, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 1483,
1501–02 (1985) (noting that directors delegate most of the day-to-day decisions to officers, and
thus fiduciary duties must focus on their monitoring role).
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B. Oversight Comes of Age
There always has been an implicit understanding that directors have
the responsibility to oversee corporate affairs, even when they are not personally responsible for such affairs. Corporate statutes provide that all corporate affairs must be managed by or under the direction of the board of
directors.25 This inherent responsibility to manage all corporate affairs has
been interpreted to mean that directors have an obligation to monitor the
decisions of those to whom they have delegated authority.26
Earlier cases recognized this responsibility, emphasizing directors’
duty to be attentive to corporate matters even when they are not personally
involved in such matters.27 As one court put it, “[d]irectors may not shut
their eyes to corporate misconduct and then claim that because they did not
see the misconduct, they did not have a duty to look. The sentinel asleep at
his post contributes nothing to the enterprise he is charged to protect.”28
Moreover, courts recognized that directors may be held liable for their failure to pay attention to corporate affairs when such failure could be viewed
as contributing to liability-causing behavior.29 In particular, courts have reasoned that directors’ inattention is problematic not only because better monitoring can prevent wrongdoing, but also because officers and employees
may be more likely to engage in misconduct if there is a perception that no
one is paying attention to their actions.30 Courts have noted that directors’
failure to act can contribute to the climate and continuation of wrongdoing,
and thus can represent a substantial reason for the corporate loss resulting
from such wrongdoing.31 In this regard, courts have acknowledged the importance of directors’ duty to pay attention, and have been willing to hold
directors liable for breaching that duty. Nevertheless, Delaware courts did
not formally consider the nature and scope of directors’ oversight responsibility until 1963.32
25. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2009).
26. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (noting that directors are entitled to rely on information provided by a limited group of agents of the corporation, or professionals, when the director reasonably believes it is prudent to do so).
27. See Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 170 (1891); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432
A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981) (citing earlier cases, and noting that directors were “under a continuing
obligation to keep informed about the activities of the corporation,” and to monitor “corporate
affairs and policies”).
28. Francis, 432 A.2d at 822.
29. See id. at 829 (finding that the negligence of one director was a substantial factor contributing to the loss perpetrated by the only two other directors).
30. See id. (“[The two converting directors] spawned their fraud in the backwater of [the
third director’s] neglect.”).
31. See id.
32. Petrin, supra note 8, at 439 (noting that Delaware “first faced” the oversight duty in
Graham); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, The Convergence of
Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 575 (2008) [hereinafter Convergence] (noting
that the Delaware Supreme Court “first took up the issue” regarding the duty to monitor in
Graham).
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When the Delaware Supreme Court initially addressed the issue, the
court acknowledged directors’ oversight responsibility, but set the bar for
compliance so low as to render the oversight doctrine largely irrelevant. In
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., several employees of AllisChalmers Manufacturing Co. (“Allis-Chalmers”) were found to have violated federal antitrust laws related to price fixing, resulting in liability to the
corporation.33 The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that there was no
evidence that the directors had any actual knowledge of illegal activity, or
that the directors had knowledge of facts that should have put them on notice about such activity.34 Nevertheless, shareholders brought suit alleging
that directors had breached their fiduciary duty by failing to take steps designed to put them on notice of illegal activities by company employees.35
The court began by acknowledging directors’ duty to supervise corporate
affairs—the duty of oversight.36 However, in the court’s view, this duty did
not require directors to actively monitor the corporation and seek to ensure
that officers and employees did not engage in wrongdoing.37 Instead, directors had the right to rely on the honesty and integrity of their subordinates
until something occurs to put them on notice of wrongdoing.38 The court
reasoned that because directors had no knowledge of illegal activity, and
had no reason to suspect such activity, they could not be held liable for
breaching their oversight duty. As the court phrased it, “absent cause for
suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists.”39 The notion that directors had no responsibility to
monitor corporate actions unless they had reason to suspect wrongdoing,
often referred to as being confronted with “red flags,”40 meant that the oversight duty required relatively passive conduct from directors. The Graham
court therefore recognized the oversight duty, but did not require directors
to exert any affirmative effort to comply with it.
In the 1996 case In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Chancery Court breathed new life into the oversight
duty, not only making clear that the responsibility existed, but also making
clear that directors had an affirmative obligation to comply with that responsibility.41 In Caremark, the Delaware Chancery Court had to review a
33. 188 A.2d 125, 128 (Del. 1963).
34. Id. at 129.
35. Id. at 127.
36. See id. at 130.
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mf. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 128 (Del. 1963).
40. See Petrin, supra note 8, at 439 (referring to “red flags” as actions that put directors on
notice of wrongdoing); Anne Tucker Nees, Who’s the Boss? Unmasking Oversight Liability
Within the Corporate Power Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 205 (2010).
41. See In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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proposed settlement of a derivative suit. The underlying suit involved
claims that directors of Caremark International, Inc. (“Caremark”) had
breached their monitoring duty by failing to uncover illegal actions by
Caremark employees who had violated federal and state laws regulating
health care providers, resulting in Caremark having to make approximately
$250 million in reimbursement payments.42 Shareholders claimed that “directors allowed a situation to develop and continue which exposed the corporation to enormous legal liability and that in doing so they violated a duty
to be active monitors of corporate performance.”43
In reviewing the settlement, the Delaware Chancery Court took the
opportunity to revisit directors’ oversight duties, and reassess the applicability of Graham. The court focused on several modern trends that had developed after Graham. The court discussed various federal laws that
incentivized corporations to establish information systems aimed at detecting violations of the law.44 The court also considered the significant
legal and economic impact such violations had on corporations, often resulting in the payment of millions of dollars in damages.45 In addition, the
court recognized that the Delaware Supreme Court recently had made clear
the seriousness with which the law viewed the role of the corporate board
through several opinions. In those opinions, the Delaware Supreme Court
not only had chastised boards for failing to perform their duties to be sufficiently informed regarding corporate affairs, but also had demonstrated a
willingness to hold them liable for breaching their duties.46 In light of these
opinions and other modern trends, the Delaware Chancery Court concluded
that Graham could no longer be interpreted to mean that boards could comply with their oversight responsibility by being passive, or otherwise only
acting upon suspicion of wrongdoing. Instead, the Delaware Chancery
Court stated that a “broader interpretation” of Graham was necessary.47
The Caremark court argued that boards could satisfy their fiduciary
duty to monitor corporate affairs only if they had established an information
system designed to provide directors and senior officers with accurate and
timely information about those affairs.48 This duty is often referred to as the
Caremark duty. Under Caremark, directors breach their oversight duty
when plaintiffs can show “either (1) that the directors knew or (2) should
have known that violations of law were occurring, and in either event, (3)
that the directors took no steps in a good faith effort to prevent or remedy
42. See id. at 960, 967.
43. See id. at 967.
44. See id. at 969–70.
45. See id.
46. See id. (discussing Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963); Smith
v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); and Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,
637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994)).
47. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996).
48. See id. at 969–70.
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that situation, and (4) that such failure proximately resulted in the losses
complained of.”49 The Caremark court did warn that liability would result
only from “a sustained or systemic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information
and reporting system exists.”50 In this respect, Caremark proclaimed that
directors’ oversight duty encompassed an active duty to establish information systems aimed at monitoring corporate conduct, but suggested that the
test for liability would be demanding.
Caremark altered the landscape with respect to oversight. The decision
spurred the development of internal control systems and more robust compliance efforts.51 Caremark also increased expectations regarding directors’
roles in overseeing corporate compliance with laws and business performance.52 Nevertheless, because it was a decision by the Delaware Chancery
Court (and it purported to reassess, if not overturn, a decision by the Delaware Supreme Court), there was some uncertainty regarding the scope and
applicability of Caremark. Ten years later, the Delaware Supreme Court
took the opportunity to clear up this uncertainty.
In the 2006 case of Stone v. Ritter,53 the Delaware Supreme Court
essentially affirmed Caremark, making clear that directors have an affirmative obligation to monitor the employees and agents who act on the corporation’s behalf. In Stone, shareholders brought a derivative suit alleging that
directors had breached their oversight duties by failing to install an appropriate information and reporting system for anti-money laundering violations by company employees.54 Because of such violations, the corporation
had to pay $50 million in fines and penalties.55 No fines and penalties were
imposed on directors, and the plaintiffs acknowledged that directors had no
knowledge of the employees’ activities, nor were directors aware of any
“red flags.”56 Nonetheless, the plaintiffs claimed that directors should be
held liable for their failure to monitor.
In assessing the plaintiffs’ claims, the Delaware Supreme Court formally approved the Caremark standard, agreeing that directors had a monitoring responsibility that required them to establish a reporting system
aimed at keeping them informed about the corporation’s compliance with
49. See id. at 971.
50. See id.
51. See Rebecca Walker, The Importance of Board Oversight of a Company’s Compliance
Program: Implications of Stone v. Ritter, in ADVANCED CORPORATE COMPLIANCE & ETHIC
WORKSHOP 2008, 403, 405 (2008) (noting Caremark’s substantial impact on compliance
programs).
52. See id. at 405 (noting that In re Caremark created a much keener awareness of the importance of board oversight).
53. See 911 A.2d 362.
54. See id. at 362, 365.
55. See id. at 365 (“AmSouth and AmSouth Bank paid $40 million in fines and $10 million
in civil penalties to resolve government and regulatory investigations . . . .”).
56. See id. at 364, 365.
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the law and its business performance.57 The court also agreed that directors
could incur liability even when they were unaware of misconduct, if it
could be shown that directors had failed to put into place policies and procedures aimed at providing them with information about company activities. The Stone court held that in order to demonstrate that directors had
breached their oversight duty, it must be established that “(a) the directors
utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls;
or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”58 On the one hand, as
Part II will discuss, the court set a high hurdle for establishing oversight
liability. However, the court’s pronouncement left no doubt that corporate
directors have an affirmative responsibility to pay attention, and to the extent their lack of attention makes it easier for misconduct to occur, or avoid
being detected, directors may be held responsible for breaching this
responsibility.
C. Oversight, Corporate Misconduct, and the Financial Crisis
The most recent financial crisis triggered renewed attention on boards’
oversight duty.59 Many commentators agree that one primary cause of the
financial crisis was that banks and other entities engaged in excessively
risky transactions.60 These commentators also agree that boards’ lax oversight may have enabled corporations to engage in such risky transactions.61
While management bears responsibility for risk management, boards have
responsibility for instituting appropriate risk management procedures, and
ensuring that those procedures are being properly executed.62 In order to
effectively carry out this responsibility, boards must have sufficient appreciation of the various risks facing corporations, and must establish and actively oversee programs aimed at ensuring that those risks are being
properly managed.63 When corporations engage in overly risky activities, it
57. See id. at 368–69.
58. See id. at 370.
59. See David A. Katz, Risk Management and the Board of Directors—An Update for 2012,
in CORPORATE GOVENANCE – A MASTER CLASS 2012, 147, 149 (2012) (noting that worldwide
financial instability has caused issues to be “front and center”); Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 968;
Miller, Board’s Duty, supra note 8, at 1154; Miller, Oversight Liability, supra note 8, at 50;
Petrin, supra note 8, at 436.
60. See Miller, Board’s Duty, supra note 8, at 1153; Miller, Oversight Liability, supra note 8,
at 50; Petrin, supra note 8, at 436–37; Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 970; Bebchuk & Spamann,
supra note 8, at 247.
61. See Miller, Board’s Duty, supra note 8, at 1154; Petrin, supra note 8, at 436–37; Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 972.
62. See Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 969–70 (explaining the process of risk management);
Katz, supra note 59, at 149–50.
63. See Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 969–70 (noting that corporations face many different
types of risk, and must make decisions related to identifying, preparing for, preventing, and responding to risks).
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raises the possibility that boards have failed in this endeavor. Hence, many
shareholders and other commentators have suggested that corporations took
on too much risk because the board failed to remain informed about the
company’s risk exposure, and failed to take steps aimed at preventing excessive risk-taking.64 The financial crisis had many causes, and there were
some risks that may have been unavoidable.65 Nevertheless, there is agreement that more effective board oversight of risks at the very least may have
mitigated the crisis and prevented some of the more significant losses both
to the corporation and broader society.66 As a result, the financial crisis
highlighted issues surrounding board oversight, particularly oversight of
risks.
Similarly, the 2002 corporate governance crisis associated with Enron
and WorldCom raised concerns about the adequacy of boards’ adherence to
their oversight duty. Evidence related to that crisis suggested that directors
did not have sufficient knowledge of their company’s accounting practices,
or of the information contained in their company’s financial statements and
other public disclosure documents.67 That governance crisis led to a growing concern that directors’ failure to monitor corporate transactions, and
their failure to employ safeguards against accounting shenanigans and other
misdeeds, contributed significantly to governance failures.68 Former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Norman Veasey argued that “the main
corporate governance failure in this period was the lassitude and indifference of some boards of directors who were not pro-active in their oversight
and strategic roles.”69
Both the financial crisis and the 2002 crisis have shoved oversight into
the spotlight and sparked a desire to ensure that directors take their oversight responsibility more seriously.70 Many believe that shoring up directors’ oversight role is critical to preventing corporate governance failures. If
boards can put in place effective information systems, they can serve as an
important check on officer and employee misbehavior. In this view, relying
64. See id. at 968; Michelle Harner, Ignoring the Writing on the Wall: The Role of Enterprise
Risk Management in the Economic Crisis, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 45, 48–52 (2010); Eric Pan, A
Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 717, 718 (2010). Bainbridge has noted that risk
management failures have many forms, from boards that failed to institute any risk management
system to those that failed to have a complete understanding of their company’s risk profile. See
Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 972 (discussing surveys in which more than half of those surveyed
blamed lax oversight of risks as a major contributing factor to the financial crisis).
65. See Steven Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response
to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 463 (2009).
66. See Miller, Board’s Duty, supra note 8, at 1154; Miller, Oversight Liability, supra note 8,
at 50.
67. See Fairfax, supra note 10, at 12–13.
68. See id.; E. Norman Veasey, Policy and Legal Overview of Best Corporate Governance
Principles, 56 SMU L. REV. 2135, 2138 (2003).
69. See id. at 2136.
70. See Nees, supra note 40, at 204; Pan, supra note 64, at 718.
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on oversight seems like an ideal way to control corporate risk-taking, minimize corporate misconduct and fraud, and improve corporate governance
generally.71
II.

OVERSIGHT

COURTS: IMMATURE, INCOHERENT,
AND IRRELEVANT?

IN THE

While enhancing board oversight duties may be an admirable goal, the
current state of the oversight doctrine, as well as courts’ current conception
of the doctrine, may severely hamper the achievement of that goal. As an
initial matter, it is possible that the relatively recent emergence of the doctrine may make it difficult to use it as a guide until more time has passed.
The relative incoherency of the doctrine also may pose challenges for its
ability to provide meaningful guidance to directors seeking to determine
how best to comply with the oversight duty. Finally, courts may have fashioned a liability standard that fails to appropriately encourage directors to
comply with their oversight duties, potentially rendering fiduciary duty law
irrelevant for the purposes of shoring up directors’ oversight obligations. As
this Part will discuss, these defects in the development and articulation of
the oversight doctrine do not bode well for efforts at enhancing board
oversight.
A.

Immaturity as a Stumbling Block

The oversight doctrine is in its infancy, which means it is still evolving, making it more challenging to pinpoint the precise contours of directors’ oversight responsibilities. It has been less than twenty years since the
Delaware Chancery Court first pinpointed the elements associated with an
oversight duty, and less than ten years since the Delaware Supreme Court
announced its acceptance of Caremark as the appropriate framework for
assessing oversight. Even in that time, Delaware courts’ assessment of
oversight responsibility and liability has evolved. As Part II.B. will reveal,
the doctrine has gone from being firmly established in the duty of care to
being classified as both a duty of loyalty and a duty of good faith.72 The
fact that the court has shifted in its treatment of the oversight doctrine may
stem, at least in part, from the fact that it takes some time for courts to
establish the precise contours of new doctrines. While this is certainly understandable, it also means that new doctrines may be in flux, making it
more challenging for directors to draw lessons from such doctrines.
Courts have raised questions about the range of activities for which
directors can incur oversight liability. For example, in In re Citigroup Inc.
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Supreme Court appeared
to indicate that oversight liability could not be extended to board inatten71. See Miller, Board’s Duty, supra note 8, at 1154.
72. See infra Part II B.

\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\10-2\UST202.txt

428

unknown

Seq: 13

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

3-JAN-14

13:52

[Vol. 10:2

tiveness related to business risks.73 As a result, some commentators have
interpreted Citigroup to exclude oversight claims based upon directors’ failure to monitor business risks.74 Others disagree, insisting that while the
court created a high burden for such claims, it nevertheless left open the
possibility for them.75 Such disagreement may stem in part from the fact
that the doctrine is continuing to evolve. Nonetheless, the disagreement underscores the uncertainty regarding the scope of the oversight doctrine,
which may undermine the ability to confidently use it as a guide for director
behavior. If directors cannot incur liability for their failure to monitor business risks, it may undermine their willingness to monitor such risks.76
The fact that the doctrine has emerged relatively recently also means
that optimal best practices related to the doctrine have likely not yet
emerged, particularly with respect to risk management. To be sure, several
key groups have generated best practices for directors’ oversight of business risks.77 However, these best practices are still evolving, and there is
not yet a clear consensus regarding them.78 Importantly, many different
models for measuring and assessing risks exist, but all of them have limitations.79 Also, the optimal risk management model varies depending on the
type of entity and its risk tolerance.80 Moreover, while some directors have
an understanding of the risks facing their companies, many others have acknowledged that they do not have a clear appreciation of their companies’
risk profiles and practices.81 Of course, the increased focus on board oversight no doubt will motivate directors to gain a better awareness of corporate risks, and seek out guidance that would enable them to better engage in
risk management.82 However, because the oversight doctrine is young and
continues to evolve, as do the best practices in this area, it may take some
time before we can expect this doctrine to provide effective guidance for
directors seeking to more effectively engage in risk oversight.
73.
74.
75.
76.
226–28
77.

See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 123 (Del. Ch. 2009).
See Pan, supra note 64, at 738.
See Miller, Oversight Liability, supra note 8, at 96; Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 979.
See Eric Pan, Rethinking the Board’s Duty to Monitor, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 209,
(2011) [hereinafter Rethinking the Board’s Duty].
See COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT—INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2004); Gregory
Monahan, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: A METHODOLOGY FOR ACHIEVING STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 12, 122 (2008) (discussing Basel II and risk management).
78. See Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 970; Betty Simkins & Steven Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide
Risk Management and Corporate Governance, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 571, 592 (2008).
79. See Miller, Oversight Liability, supra note 8, at 60; Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 970.
80. See Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 970.
81. See id. at 972.
82. See Michael E. Murphy, Assuring Responsible Risk Management in Banking: The Corporate Governance Dimension, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 121, 128–29 (2011) (discussing some best practices guides).
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B. The Coherency Conundrum
Unfortunately, as the oversight doctrine has evolved, problems with
coherency have emerged, and these problems could undermine its effectiveness. These problems stem in large part from the Delaware Supreme
Court’s decision to essentially reclassify the Caremark duty of oversight.
The Caremark court clearly analyzed the oversight duty under a duty
of care framework. The Caremark complaint charged directors with a
breach of their duty of care, characterizing the directors’ inattention as a
breach of the duty of care in the ongoing operations of the corporation’s
business.83 The Caremark court accepted this characterization, referring to
directors’ failure to monitor as a breach of their duty of care.84 The court
also specifically distinguished claims related to the oversight duty from
claims involving “director self-dealing, or the more difficult loyalty-type
problems . . . .”85 Thus, there is no question that the Caremark court considered the duty of oversight to be a care-based one, and not one implicating a
loyalty breach.
However, when the Delaware Supreme Court ultimately purported to
approve Caremark, it re-characterized the oversight duty as a duty of loyalty.86 The Stone court reasoned that Caremark required proof of bad faith
conduct. The Stone court based this reasoning on language in Caremark
indicating that a lack of good faith was a necessary condition to liability for
an oversight breach.87 The Stone court then insisted that bad faith required
conduct “qualitatively different from, and more culpable than, the conduct
giving rise to a violation of the fiduciary duty of care . . . .”88 As a result,
the Stone court held that because a showing of bad faith conduct “is essential to establish director oversight liability, the fiduciary duty violated by
that conduct is the duty of loyalty.”89 Hence, the court reframed the oversight duty as a duty of loyalty even as it purported to affirm Caremark. In
so doing, as one observer notes, the Stone court “ripped the Caremark claim
from its original home in the duty of care and reinvented it as a duty of
loyalty.”90
Presumably, if the Delaware Supreme Court had directly overturned
Caremark, the court would have provided a more in-depth rationale for its
decision to depart from the principles underlying Caremark.91 By contrast,
the fact that the Stone court purported to affirm Caremark, while drastically
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
See id. at 971.
See id.
See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
See id. at 368–69.
See id. at 369.
See id. at 370.
Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 975.
See Convergence, supra note 32, at 598.
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re-characterizing it, enabled the court to avoid providing a clear explanation
for that re-characterization.92 The avoidance has implication for future efforts at interpreting the oversight doctrine. On the one hand, commentators
who have sought to interpret the court’s re-characterization tend to agree on
at least two primary rationales, both of which suggest a desire to enhance
shareholders’ ability to impose personal liability on directors. First, some
argue that the re-characterization was driven by a desire to avoid the protection from liability provided by state exculpatory statutes, such as section
102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law.93 Such statutes enable
corporations to create charter provisions that limit or eliminate shareholders’ ability to hold directors liable in money damages for breaching their
fiduciary duty.94 However, such statutes do not allow for such limitations
with respect to breaches of the duty of loyalty.95 Thus, corporations that
have opted into the protections afforded by exculpatory statutes can shield
directors from duty of care breaches, but not duty of loyalty breaches. As a
consequence, shareholders previously were prevented from holding directors personally liable for breaching their duty of oversight under such charter provisions.96 Placed in this context, the shift from characterizing
oversight as a care duty to one based in loyalty may be viewed as an effort
to increase the potential for personal liability by avoiding the protections of
exculpatory statutes.97 This view seems particularly plausible given that the
shift occurred in the midst of concerns that directors were not being held
sufficiently accountable for their failure to effectively monitor corporate
misconduct.98
Second, many hypothesized that the re-characterization was driven by
the desire to side-step the protections of the business judgment rule, which
also increases the potential for personal liability. In order to prove that directors have breached their duty of care, shareholders must overcome the
presumption of the business judgment rule, which presumes that directors’
92. See id.
93. See id. at 597 (noting that Delaware’s exculpation provision seemed to be driving the
court’s analysis in Stone); Robert B. Thompson, The Short, But Interesting Life of Good Faith as
an Independent Liability Rule, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 543, 551 (2010/2011).
94. See Convergence, supra note 32, at 551; Thompson, supra note 93, at 551.
95. See Convergence, supra note 32, at 597. Thus, while § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware code
enables corporations to exculpate directors for monetary liability for breaching their fiduciary
duty, liability cannot be eliminated for violations of the duty of loyalty. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7) (2001).
96. See Regina F. Burch, “Unfit to Serve” Post-Enron, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1081, 1094
(2008) (noting that limits under Delaware’s § 102(b)(7) exculpatory charter provisions applied to
Caremark claims).
97. See Convergence, supra note 32, at 975. Professor Bainbridge does note, however, that
the high standards established by the Stone court effectively replicated directors’ insulation from
monetary damages. See id. at 976.
98. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias, 32 J.
CORP. L. 833, 847–48 (2007); Renee M. Jones, The Role of Good Faith in Delaware: How OpenEnded Standards Help Delaware Preserve its Edge, 55 N.Y. L. SCH. REV. 499, 510 (2010/2011).
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actions are in good faith and consistent with the corporation’s best interests.99 Overcoming this presumption is extremely difficult. Thus, empirical
evidence reveals that duty of care breaches resulting in personal liability are
very rare, due in large part to the protections afforded by the business judgment rule.100 However, while duty of care breaches are analyzed by reference to the business judgment rule, duty of loyalty breaches are not. By
classifying oversight breaches as loyalty breaches, such breaches lose the
protection of the business judgment rule, and thus appear to be more susceptible to personal liability.
However, both of these hypotheses seem inconsistent with Delaware
courts’ rhetoric, creating confusion regarding how best to interpret the oversight doctrine. Indeed, the courts’ rhetoric both in Caremark and Stone
strongly indicates the desire to limit the extent to which directors can be
held personally liable for oversight breaches. In Caremark, the court called
a claim for oversight liability “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”101 The
Stone court reiterated this point, confirming the desire to severely curtail
personal liability in this area.102 In this respect, the rhetoric appears to diverge from potential explanations of the courts’ re-categorization. This creates a lack of clarity for the oversight doctrine.
The shift also seems inconsistent with the traditional understanding of
the loyalty and care doctrines, potentially creating confusion and incoherency. Oversight claims seem more suited to a care-based analysis. The carebased duty to remain informed seems more closely aligned with the oversight duty because that duty relates to the obligation to establish systems
aimed at keeping directors informed. By comparison, the oversight duty
bears no real resemblance to traditional loyalty claims. Loyalty cases typically involve a director having some conflict or otherwise receiving some
financial benefit that is later stripped from him or her.103 Yet Stone extends
loyalty into a realm where directors receive no benefit, and otherwise have
no particular conflict of interest. Given loyalty’s historical framework, clas99. See Corporate Directors Guidebook—Sixth Edition, supra note 6, at 995; Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360–61
(Del. 1993).
100. See Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 591 (1983);
Henry Ridgley Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware Business Judgment Rule,
19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 982 (1994); Joseph Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks, New Trends
in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968). See
also Black, et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1059 (2006). Of course,
indemnification as well as D&O insurance also account for the rarity of personal liability associated with duty of care claims.
101. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
102. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 372 (Del. 2006).
103. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967; Convergence, supra
note 32, at 585.
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sifying oversight as a duty of loyalty violation is “quite odd.”104 The oddness decreases the ability to consistently analyze an oversight claim.
The court’s analysis also raises questions about the reach of the business judgment rule in the context of oversight claims. As a general matter, it
was understood that the business judgment rule had no applicability in at
least two settings: (1) an “unconsidered failure to act” by directors because
directors cannot be said to exercise judgment when they have not acted,105
and (2) in the context of duty of loyalty breaches because directors cannot
be presumed to act in good faith, or otherwise in the corporation’s best
interests, when they are confronted with transactions in which they may
receive some personal benefit or have some conflict.106 At first glance, the
oversight breach seems to implicate both of these settings, and hence the
business judgment rule appears to have no applicability to such a breach.
However, courts have not given clear guidance on this issue. Because the
oversight breach does not involve issues regarding self-interest, those
breaches leave open the possibility that the business judgment rule can be
applied even though the breach is characterized as one involving loyalty.
Moreover, courts have reasoned that once a board establishes an information and reporting system, the level and detail of the system is the subject of
business judgment.107 Such reasoning indicates that the business judgment
rule remains relevant when analyzing breaches of oversight, even when
there appears to be a failure to take action. At least one court has confirmed
this possibility, insisting that directors continue to be afforded the protection of the business judgment rule when assessing whether they have
breached their oversight responsibilities.108 Other commentators similarly
have suggested that directors remain protected by the business judgment
rule when courts evaluate the appropriateness of their oversight.109 The potential confusion surrounding whether the business judgment rule has a role
to play in oversight breaches only underscores the incoherent state of the
doctrine, undermining its predictability.
Adding to the overall confusion, the Stone court characterized the
oversight duty as a duty of good faith. In so doing, the court appeared to be
closing a loophole in the fiduciary duty doctrine. While the concept of good
104. See Convergence, supra note 32, at 585, 587 (referring to the court’s reinterpretation of
oversight as a loyalty duty as “simply shoddy”).
105. See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967; Veasey, supra note 68, at 2144 (noting that the
business judgment rule has no role when directors have failed to act, unless their failure results
from a conscious decision not to act); Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32
DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 727–728 (explaining that Caremark makes a distinction between cases in
which boards act and thus such actions must be considered in light of the business judgment rule,
and cases in which boards fail to act and hence their actions must be measured by some other
standard).
106. Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 975.
107. See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
108. See Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 935 (Del. Ch. 2007).
109. See Katz, supra note 59, at 151.
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faith is not new, as a matter of fiduciary duty law it was relatively unexplored, and often subsumed under either the duty of loyalty or the duty of
care. In the 2006 case of In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, the
Delaware Supreme Court suggested that directors had a seemingly independent duty of good faith, but left open the question of whether that duty was
entirely distinct from the traditional duties of loyalty and care.110 The Stone
court addressed this question in three ways. First, the Stone court argued
that a breach of the duty of oversight constituted a breach of the duty of
good faith.111 As indicated in the earlier discussion, the Stone court reasoned that this conclusion was compelled by Caremark’s heavy reliance on
concepts of good faith. Second, the Stone court insisted that good faith did
not represent a separate duty.112 Third, the Stone court reasoned that the
duty of good faith should be viewed as a subset of the duty of loyalty, and
that one of the ways in which good faith could be breached is through an
oversight failure.113 In other words, a breach of the duty of oversight represents a breach of the duty of good faith, which in turn represents a breach of
the duty of loyalty.
This rather convoluted analysis of oversight raised more questions than
it answered. What other types of ways could directors breach the duty of
good faith? What other categories of loyalty breaches existed? If good faith
and loyalty are the same, how should one view Delaware’s exculpatory provision which specifically pinpoints both doctrines? Indeed, the Disney court
had suggested that good faith and loyalty were distinct because Delaware’s
exculpatory statute contained a carve-out for both kinds of conduct.114 As a
result, conflating the two seems potentially problematic. Also, as indicated
in the earlier discussion, since both good faith and loyalty breaches cannot
be limited under a corporation’s exculpatory provision, should oversight
breaches be more susceptible to claims for personal liability? It is not clear
how these questions should be answered.
The fact that the oversight doctrine has been left in a somewhat confusing state undermines its strength, jeopardizing its use as a guide for corporate behavior and liability for that behavior. As one commentator notes,
the court’s reinterpretation of Caremark failed “to set forth clearly the new
rules of the game.”115 In so doing, the court generated confusion about the
precise standards that apply to directors’ conduct, the manner in which directors meet those standards, and the extent to which those standards can

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006).
See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006).
See id.
See id. at 370.
See In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 27.
Convergence, supra note 32, at 598.
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and should result in liability.116 Such confusion undermines efforts at expanding the doctrine.
C. Trending Towards Exoneration and Irrelevance
Even if directors can determine the nature of the conduct that renders
them liable, many have raised concerns about the possibility that the oversight doctrine may fail to encourage directors to comply with their oversight
duty in any meaningful manner.
Courts have repeatedly emphasized the high hurdle shareholders must
cross in order to prove an oversight breach. Consistent with this emphasis,
courts have been clear that only a “very extreme set of facts” would lead to
a finding of oversight liability.117 Moreover, as noted earlier, the Caremark
court referred to an oversight claim as “possibly the most difficult theory in
corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”118
The Stone court repeated this reference, suggesting that the burden for proving a breach of oversight may be almost insurmountable.119 Given that duty
of care breaches almost never result in personal liability, referring to an
oversight claim as the “most” difficult theory suggests that it will be virtually impossible for oversight breaches to result in personal liability for directors. This difficulty is clearly reflected in the fact that current evidence
reveals only one post-Stone case has resulted in a finding of liability.120
The Stone court then added to this burden by requiring proof of scienter for oversight liability. When Stone recast the oversight claim as a good
faith duty, it also insisted that such a duty required scienter—a showing that
directors knew or should have known that they were disregarding their duties.121 As one court put it,
[D]irector liability for failure to monitor required a finding that
the directors acted with the state of mind traditionally used to
define the mindset of a disloyal director—bad faith—because
their indolence was so persistent that it could not be ascribed to
anything other than a knowing decision not to even try to make
sure the corporation’s officers had developed and were implementing a prudent approach to ensuring law compliance.122
At the pleading stage, this scienter element means that shareholders
must plead particularized facts showing that directors consciously disregarded an obligation to be reasonably informed, or consciously disregarded
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
A.2d at
122.

See Nees, supra note 40, at 205–06.
See In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 654–55 (Del. Ch. 2008).
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 372 (Del. 2006).
See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
See Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 240 (Del. 2009); see also Stone, 911
370.
Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 935 (Del. Ch. 2007).
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the duty to monitor and oversee the business. This poses difficulty because
shareholders must prove a culpable state of mind based on inaction. “Short
of requiring intent to inflict actual harm, one can hardly imagine a more
demanding liability standard.”123 As another commentator explained it,
[U]nless the director’s failure to act was the product of deliberation (which takes the matter outside of the duty to monitor), no
records, witnesses, or other readily available pieces of evidence
will be available to inform a court whether the board’s failure to
act was an act of carelessness or disloyalty.124
As a result, courts must be willing to draw inferences from a board’s
inaction. However, the inferences courts appear willing to draw all flow in a
direction that seems to avoid holding directors liable for their monitoring
efforts. Hence, courts seem willing to infer good faith, or at least a lack of
bad faith, so long as directors have made any effort at implementing a monitoring system.125
The result is that, as applied, the scienter-based standard appears to
practically guarantee that directors will escape liability for oversight claims.
Under Caremark and Stone, there are essentially three ways in which shareholders can establish that boards have breached their oversight duty: (1) an
unconsidered failure to establish a system, (2) a failure to monitor the established system, and (3) the failure to respond to red flags.
With one notable exception, the first type of breach is largely irrelevant as applied to most modern corporations. This is because the vast majority of public corporations, by virtue of federal law and other practices,
have a monitoring or internal control system in place with the purported
goal of bringing material information to the attention of directors.126 Hence,
most oversight suits are not based on claims involving the failure to institute an information system.
Instead, shareholder suits typically contend that the system directors
installed is inadequate, or otherwise that directors have failed to properly
monitor the system.127 However, because proving scienter or bad faith is so
difficult, almost any monitoring effort, however, minimal or formulaic, appears to prevent a showing of bad faith. Thus, courts have indicated that a
showing of bad faith will not result from demonstrating that directors’ monitoring efforts were inadequate, flawed, or represented a sharp departure
123. Petrin, supra note 8, at 456.
124. See Rethinking the Board’s Duty, supra note 76, at 210.
125. See Desimone, 924 A.2d, at 940 (noting that the plaintiff needed to demonstrate facts
suggesting that directors knew about the inadequacy of internal controls, but chose to ignore
them); see also Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 143 (Del. 2008) (suggesting that plaintiffs needed
to demonstrate that directors knew or participated in wrongdoing); see also Pan, supra note 64, at
734–35.
126. See Walker, supra note 51, at 405.
127. See Pan, supra note 64, at 733–38 (describing oversight cases after Stone).
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from best practices.128 Instead, only when directors “completely” or “utterly” fail to take any actions aimed at monitoring corporate conduct would
they be liable for breaching their duty of good faith.129 In other words,
courts appear to measure breaches of oversight based on “how far above
nothing” directors’ actions fall.130 The result is that it is rare for shareholders to successfully plead an oversight claim, and almost unheard of for
shareholders to successfully hold directors liable for breaching their oversight duty.131 In this regard, the cases after Stone highlight the ease with
which directors can comply with their duty as well as the seemingly insurmountable burden shareholders bear when seeking to hold directors liable
for breaching that duty.
To date, there appears to be only one post-Stone case in which directors were found liable for breaching their oversight duty, which is the exception that proves the rule, demonstrating that only when directors
completely abandon their monitoring duties will they be liable for breach.
In that case, the directors made absolutely no attempt to establish a reporting and information system, and had not even considered such a system.132
Moreover, directors entirely deferred to others in matters relating to corporate business.133 The court found directors liable for breaching their oversight duty because they “did nothing to make themselves aware of this
blatant misconduct or to stop it.”134 This case seems to underscore the notion that only when directors effectively abdicate their monitoring responsibilities will they be found liable for breaching them.
Importantly, this burden does not get any easier when shareholders
seek to demonstrate oversight liability by virtue of a failure to respond to
red flags. Red flags constitute facts or issues that should put directors on
notice of potential illegal actions or wrongdoing of others within the corporation.135 Directors’ failure to respond to red flags can result in oversight
liability.136 However, the burden associated with proving the existence of
red flags, and imposing liability for ignoring those red flags, appears exceptionally high. As an initial matter, there is considerable uncertainty regarding what even constitutes a red flag, which often results in the court
rejecting shareholder allegations of red flags.137 More importantly, courts
128. See Thompson, supra note 93, at 550–51.
129. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243–44 (Del. 2009).
130. See Thompson, supra note 93, at 550.
131. See Rethinking the Board’s Duty, supra note 76, at 216.
132. See ATR-KTM ENG Fin. Corp. v. Araneta, No. CIV.A. 489-N, 2006 WL 3783520 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 21, 2006), aff’d, 930 A.2d 928 (Del. 2007).
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. See Petrin, supra note 8, at 439; see also Nees, supra note 40, at 205.
136. See Petrin, supra note 8, at 439; see also Nees, supra note 40, at 205; Sale, supra note
105, at 735.
137. See Sale, supra note 105, at 735–43 (noting that Delaware has not really addressed the
issue of what counts as a red flag); see also Nees, supra note 40, at 206 (noting the court’s failure
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have argued that liability can only be found when red flags are either
“waived in one’s face or displayed so that they are visible to the careful
observer.”138
Collectively, these cases underscore the difficulty of holding directors
liable for breaching their oversight duty. A review of cases that hold directors liable for breaching their duty of care reveal that such liability is extremely rare.139 Based on Delaware courts’ current assessment of oversight,
liability in that area will be rarer still, with virtually no cases imposing
liability on directors for their inattention.
Of course, there may be good reasons for courts’ reluctance to hold
directors liable for breaching their oversight duty. First, courts historically
have been reluctant to second-guess directors’ business decisions by holding them liable when those decisions result in losses.140 Courts are mindful
that directors have been entrusted with making business decisions, some of
which may, upon hindsight, appear foolish, unwise, or extremely risky.141 If
courts hold directors liable for such decisions, they may inappropriately replace their judgment with those of directors who have greater business experience. They also may inappropriately undermine directors’ willingness
to make risky decisions, many of which may prove beneficial to the corporation.142 Thus, courts historically have adopted a standard that enables directors to make decisions in good faith, and seeks to avoid second-guessing
those decisions. Such a standard appears to apply when courts must determine whether directors exercised appropriate judgment about the best monitoring system to establish. Second, one can imagine that if courts are
reluctant to hold directors liable for flawed or shoddy actions, they would
be even more reluctant to hold them liable for inaction. Third, holding directors liable for oversight runs the risk of making directors guarantors for
to define what constitutes a red flag) and 237–40 (discussing potential test for determining red
flags); see also Rethinking the Board’s Duty, supra note 76, at 233 (noting courts rejection of
shareholder allegations regarding red flags); see also Paul Graf, Red Flags in the Morning, Directors Take Warning. . ., 6 BUS. L. BRIEF 19, 19–21 (2010); see also In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder
Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 128 (Del. Ch. 2009) (rejecting shareholder allegations of red
flags).
138. See Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 143 (Del. 2008).
139. See Cohn, supra note 100, at 591; Horsey, supra note 100, at 982; Bishop, supra note
100, at 1099; see also Black, et al., supra note 100, at 1059.
140. See Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 984 (discussing rationale for business judgment rule, and
courts reluctance to second-guess directors). As one court notes, Delaware Courts give “great
deference to the substance of the directors’ decision and will not invalidate the decision, will not
examine its reasonableness, and ‘will not substitute [its] views for those of the board if the latter’s
decision can be “attributed to any rational business purpose.”’” Paramount Commc’n., Inc. v.
QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 45 n.17 (Del. 1994) (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985) (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.
1971))).
141. See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
142. See Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 984; see also David Rosenberg, Supplying the Adverb:
The Future of Corporate Risk-Taking and the Business Judgment Rule, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J.
216, 218 (2009).
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large corporate losses. Courts have repeatedly emphasized that no monitoring system is foolproof, and hence that we cannot and should not expect
that a system will eradicate corporate wrongdoing.143 Unfortunately, it is all
too tempting to conclude that if a company suffers loss as a result of a
business risk or illegal activity within the corporation, directors should have
done more, and thus should be liable for breaching their oversight duty.
Courts must set a standard that protects against this temptation, or courts
run the risk that every instance of wrongdoing will result in oversight liability for directors.
Regardless of the legitimacy of these rationales, the high hurdle that
must be cleared in order to hold directors liable for breaching their oversight responsibilities may mean that fiduciary duty law will not be able to
play a significant role in ensuring directors’ vigilant adherence to their
oversight responsibilities. The relatively low threshold for satisfying the
oversight duty may fail to encourage directors to monitor in a more robust
fashion. Instead, such a threshold poses a danger that companies will structure their oversight policies around the minimum requirements needed to
satisfy courts’ liability standard.144 Even more troubling, some have worried that courts’ oversight standard may actively undermine directors’ more
robust compliance with their oversight responsibilities. One commentator
has noted that courts’ refusal to hold directors liable for oversight failures
has encouraged boards to be uninformed.145 Because the scienter-based
standard suggest that directors may only be found liable for conduct when
there is evidence of their knowing disregard of their duties, the current conception may incentivize directors to avoid asking questions or otherwise
gathering information about potential problematic actions so as to avoid a
paper trail or record of their actions that could lead to a finding of liability.146 After discussions with former Chancellor William Allen, the author
of the Caremark decision, Professor Jennifer Arlen points out that Chancellor Allen indicated that Caremark was motivated by concern that directors
had become “overly passive,”147 and thus that two of the primary goals of
Caremark were to expand directors’ oversight responsibilities, and to induce directors to play a more active role in oversight.148 After careful consideration of the impact of Caremark on board behavior, Professor Arlen
143. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. 2006).
144. See Katz, supra note 59, at 152 (warning that companies should not create risk management policies around the minimum requirements needed to satisfy the business judgment rule).
145. See Rethinking the Board’s Duty, supra note 76, at 210 (noting that the Delaware courts’
current conception of oversight “rewards ignorance and passivity by directors, imposing little
obligation on them to take an active interest in the corporation’s business.”).
146. See id.
147. See Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark, & Stone: The Director’s
Evolving Duty to Monitor, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 339, 339 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1304272.
148. See id. at 340.
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concludes that while Caremark was successful in expanding directors’
oversight duties, Caremark has not succeeded in inducing active oversight
by directors, nor does it provide any substantial deterrence.149 Consistent
with this conclusion, by potentially undermining the extent to which directors feel compelled to comply with their oversight responsibilities, Delaware courts may have rendered the oversight doctrine largely irrelevant.
Many have argued that fiduciary duty law can have an impact on corporate behavior even when courts do not hold directors liable for breaching
their duty. The Delaware Supreme Court has insisted that there is a distinction between standards of liability and standards of conduct, suggesting that
even when a director’s conduct is insufficient to warrant liability, it nevertheless may fall short of what is deemed best practice and thus be considered problematic.150 Consistent with this reasoning, commentators insist
that Delaware law serves an important signaling function by signaling directors, officers, and their advisors of the most appropriate standards of
conduct.151 Commentators further insist that this function operates irrespective of legal liability, and may be the primary function of Delaware law.152
As a result, the fact that Delaware law fails to impose liability for oversight
breaches does not undermine its ability to shape director conduct. Instead,
Delaware law continues to inform behavior by setting a standard of conduct
clearly higher than the liability standard.
On the one hand, it is clear that courts have had an impact on the
increased recognition of directors’ oversight duty, as well as the increased
recognition that directors need to establish information and reporting systems in order to comply with that duty. The court’s language in Caremark
spurred the development of corporate internal control systems. Caremark
and its progeny also likely sparked the development of best practices in this
area. Thus, it would be a mistake to suggest that court pronouncements do
not have an impact on the corporate environment in general and director
behavior in particular.
However, it also would be a mistake to suggest that the high hurdle for
liability in this area does impact the manner in which directors’ compliance
efforts develop, and does not have the potential for undermining the
strength of those efforts. The issue regarding oversight is not whether direc149. See id. at 339–40; see also Thompson, supra note 93, at 556.
150. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000) (noting that “[a]spirational ideals of
good corporate governance practices for boards . . . do not define standards of liability.”).
151. See Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the Optimal Penumbra
of Delaware Corporation Law, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 333, 354 (2009) [hereinafter Executive
Compensation]; David A. Skeel, Shaming in Corporate Law, U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1829 (2001);
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1270 (1999);
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1009, 1016 (1997).
152. See Executive Compensation, supra note 151, at 354; Skeel, supra note 151, at 1829;
Eisenberg, supra note 151, at 1270; Rock, supra note 151, at 1016.
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tors must establish an information and reporting system—courts have been
clear with respect to such an obligation, and courts have been clear that
directors’ failure to establish any such system could lead to liability. Instead, the issue is how effective must those systems be? It is this issue that
courts’ refusal to impose liability may impact in a negative fashion.
Because courts have made clear that they will impose liability only in
those situations where directors fail to establish a system, or otherwise fail
to take any action, there is reason to be skeptical regarding the ability of
courts to take on a signaling role that motivates behavior beyond the minimum requirements associated with that liability. First, even if court signaling or sermonizing is enough on its own to shape director conduct, the high
standard courts have established for proving oversight liability means that
many cases are dismissed at the pleading stage.153 Such dismissals undermine the extent to which courts have the opportunity to engage in appropriate signaling. Second, the high burden for demonstrating oversight liability
may dissuade shareholders from bringing meritorious claims, thus denying
courts the opportunity to sermonize about them.154 Third, it is not clear that
court sermonizing or signaling can encourage appropriate behavior without
some possibility of liability, not only because the lack of liability may send
a mixed message, but also because most commentators agree that extralegal
measures must be combined with legal liability to achieve optimal levels of
effectiveness. Indeed, how should directors interpret courts’ signal when
courts repeatedly insist that their conduct is not worthy of punishment, but
yet is somehow still blameworthy? Then too, studies suggest that extralegal
measures may be insufficient on their own to impact corporate behavior.155
Instead, some form of personal liability must supplement them in order to
be truly effective.156 Finally, one has to question whether courts are truly
interested in a signaling role, particularly with respect to oversight. Putting
aside that thus far courts have created a relatively convoluted roadmap from
which directors are supposed to receive guidance related to oversight,
courts also seem to have ducked, rather than confronted, important issues
related to oversight liability. This can be seen in recent cases in which
courts have chosen to leave open the issue regarding whether business risks
should be the subject of directors’ oversight duty, rather than affirmatively
settle it.157 All of these issues raise doubt regarding courts’ signaling function, while increasing the possibility that courts’ failure to impose liability
153. See Rethinking the Board’s Duty, supra note 76, at 216.
154. See id. at 211 (noting concern that the bad faith standard may undermine plaintiffs’ desire
to bring forward meritorious duty to monitor claims).
155. See Fairfax, supra note 10, at 1–2 (citing studies).
156. See id.
157. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 126 (Del. Ch. 2009);
see also In re The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 151, at *71–72
(Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011).
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for oversight breaches may undermine their ability to play a role in ensuring
more effective compliance with the monitoring role.
III. THE WORKABILITY

OF THE

OVERSIGHT DOCTRINE

Even if directors wanted to better comply with the oversight doctrine,
that task may prove difficult for several reasons. The size and complexity of
the modern corporation may render oversight of any corporation extremely
challenging. The inherently broad scope of the oversight duty also may
make it unmanageable. More importantly, boards may not have the capacity
to effectively perform their oversight obligations, particularly when viewed
in light of other demands on their time and their independent status. This
Part discusses these hurdles.
A. Challenges Associated with the Size of Modern Corporations
The sheer size of the modern corporation makes the oversight task
difficult. The Delaware Supreme Court in Graham specifically pinpointed
the practical limitations of holding directors responsible for overseeing
large corporations. The company in Graham employed more than thirty-one
thousand people, had twenty-four plants, 145 sales offices, and five thousand dealers and distributors.158 The court argued that the “very magnitude
of the enterprise required [directors] to confine their control to the broad
policy decisions.”159 The court also reasoned that the very extent of the
corporation’s operations made it impractical for directors to be able to effectively monitor the actions of the corporation and all its various divisions.160 This practical limitation prompted the court to severely restrict the
ability to hold directors liable for an oversight failure. In this regard, Graham specifically recognized that the nature of a large enterprise undermined
the extent to which we could expect directors to actively perform their monitoring responsibilities.
While modern courts have expanded the oversight doctrine, the size
issue has severely constrained expectations regarding director oversight. Directors’ oversight responsibility has been limited to ensuring that they establish an information system aimed at keeping them abreast of corporate
operations and then monitor that system.161 Hence, the oversight duty does
not require that directors have intimate knowledge about all of the activities
occurring within a corporation. In fact, the Caremark court indicated that it
would simply be inconsistent with the scale and scope of modern organizations to expect directors to have detailed information about all aspects of a
158.
159.
160.
161.

See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 128 (Del. 1963).
Id. at 130.
Id. at 128.
See In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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corporation’s operations.162 However, this observation begs the question—
what should we expect from directors in light of the corporation’s size?
Courts seem to suggest that our expectations should be very low, at least
with respect to liability for oversight. Thus, it appears that so long as directors have some system in place that (a) on paper appears aimed at informing
directors, (b) delegates responsibility to officers, and (c) relies on those officers for periodic reports regarding material events, directors have met
their oversight duty.163 In this respect, courts appear to have allowed the
size of modern corporations to significantly constrain their expectations regarding board oversight.
While this response to the size issue may appear inappropriate, the size
issue does raise real questions about whether and to what extent we can
expect directors’ oversight duty to improve corporate governance. The size
issue appears to limit expectations regarding directors’ ability to garner the
information necessary to be active monitors of corporate conduct and misconduct. A similar observation can also be made about managers. It is certainly the case that we expect the CEO and other managers to have the
capacity to effectively manage the far-flung operations of most modern corporations, and thus to overcome the size issue. However, this does not negate the relative complexity of such management. Moreover, managers are
familiar with the day-to-day operations of the corporation, and thus may be
better equipped to grapple with the challenges associated with staying on
top of the affairs of enterprises that are national, and often international, in
scope. The same is not true of directors, and thus greater attention must be
paid to how the size issue should impact directors’ oversight, or we run the
risks of either expecting too much, or believing we can expect very little.
B. Oversight as Beyond the Scope
It is also possible that the scope of the oversight duty is so broad that it
may be unmanageable. The very fact that oversight imposes liability on
directors for what they have failed to do makes it difficult to define its
scope.164 Even without a precise scope, we know that the responsibility
covers many more actions than those covered by the duty of care or the
duty of loyalty. As one scholar noted, “the universe of all actions not taken
is always far greater than the roster of actions taken.”165 Because the oversight duty covers this universe, it is potentially far-reaching, which directors
could find unworkable.
162. Id.
163. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 373 (Del. 2006);
Thompson, supra note 93, at 555–56.
164. See Rethinking the Board’s Duty, supra note 76, at 209.
165. Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director’s Duty of Attention:
Time for Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477, 1485 (1984).
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Of course, there is some suggestion that the oversight duty only extends to legal compliance, which could narrow the scope of the duty. In
Citigroup, the Delaware Supreme Court suggested that oversight only involved monitoring to ensure legal compliance, and that Caremark was not
designed to hold directors liable for failing to properly evaluate and monitor
business risk.166 If this suggestion is accurate, then the duty may be more
manageable, particularly because directors may be able to rely on counsel
and well-established legal compliance departments to help them meet their
responsibilities. Of course, even if the oversight responsibility was limited
solely to legal compliance, there are a vast number of laws with which
corporations must comply, and thus the potential oversight of that compliance is very broad.
Then too, others have suggested, and even advocated for, an oversight
duty that includes monitoring for business risks. In fact, there is good reason to believe that Caremark extends beyond monitoring for legal compliance. The Caremark court noted that the board had a responsibility to put
into place a system aimed at providing information regarding events within
the corporation so that judgments could be made “concerning both the corporation’s compliance with the law and its business performance.”167 Then
too, although Citigroup appears to question the wisdom of extending oversight liability to cases involving oversight of business risks, it nevertheless
concedes the possibility of an oversight claim related to business risk
“under some set of facts.”168 Moreover, many contend that the oversight
duty should extend to business risks. Professor Stephen Bainbridge notes
that there is no doctrinal reason why Caremark claims cannot extend to
suits implicating lax monitoring of business risk.169 According to Professor
Bainbridge, some best practices guides either link or conflate oversight of
legal compliance with oversight of risks.170
On one hand, there are many good reasons for insisting that directors’
monitoring duty does and should extend beyond oversight of legal compliance. On the other hand, such an extension only increases the tasks for
which directors are responsible for monitoring. Like the issue with respect
to corporate size, however, we need to grapple with how directors can best
accomplish this task given its tremendous breadth. One solution may be to
narrow the duty to particular kinds of business risks over which directors
166. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 131 (Del. Ch. 2009);
see also Rethinking the Board’s Duty, supra note 76, at 212 (noting that the court had effectively
“closed the door” on duty to monitor claims involving a board’s failure to monitor business risk).
167. See In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (emphasis
added); see also Rethinking the Board’s Duty, supra note 76, at 212–13 (noting that Caremark
provided a rationale for an expansive monitoring duty covering “a broad range of legal and business harms to the corporation”).
168. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 126.
169. See Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 968.
170. Id. at 980.
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already have some additional role, such as accounting matters or compensation. Regardless of the potential solution, it is possible that the oversight
doctrine is unworkable without some narrowing of its scope.
C. The Capacity of a Director
It also is not clear that directors have the capacity to effectively engage
in oversight in light of their increasingly broader responsibilities. Boards
have been tasked with increasingly greater responsibilities in recent years,
from overseeing compensation packages and structure, to more actively
monitoring the director election process and engagement with shareholders.171 These tasks, if performed effectively, require significant amounts of
work and time commitment. Empirical evidence confirms that directors
have increased the amount of time they spend on board matters. Such evidence reveals that meetings are running longer, and boards are meeting
more frequently.172 This increased time commitment has implications for
effective board oversight because boards may be spreading themselves too
thin by seeking to accomplish an increasingly wide range of tasks.
Importantly, effective oversight demands that boards devote even more
time to carrying out their responsibilities. Thus, best practices emphasize
the need for directors to meet more often with key members of management
to gain insights about material actions and operations.173 Best governance
practices also require boards to engage in more periodic review of corporate
policies and procedures so that the oversight effort is an ongoing one.174
This increased time commitment raises questions about whether directors
realistically have the capacity to meet their new obligations.
This is especially true when one considers that the burden of carrying
out these tasks often falls on a subset of the board. Many corporations delegate the oversight task to the audit committee.175 However, many board
reforms focus on enhancing the work of the audit committee. For example,
Sarbanes-Oxley required the audit committee to have more oversight of the
corporation’s financial statements and auditing process.176 As a result, the
work of the audit committee increased, which was reflected in an increase
in the number of hours directors spent serving on the audit committee.177
Thus, in 2010, the audit committee met nearly twice as often as the next
171. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate Federalism, and the Declining Significance of Federal Reforms on State Director Independence Standards, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 381,
413 (2005).
172. See SPENCER STUART, 2011 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 26–27 (2011).
173. See Katz, supra note 59, at 152–55.
174. See id. (discussing best practices with respect to risk management).
175. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 54 (Del. 2005); Walker, supra
note 51, at 413.
176. Walker, supra note 51, at 407–08.
177. Id. at 408.
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most active committee of the board.178 The average size of an audit committee is three directors. This means that we are expecting that a small number of already over-burdened directors will be able to carry out an everbroadening array of demanding tasks.
The fact that these increased responsibilities require directors to devote
more time to their fiduciary responsibilities does not negate the importance
of those responsibilities, or otherwise suggest that those increases are not
legitimate. However, it does raise serious questions about whether directors
can effectively tackle their duties.
D. Independence as a Hurdle
The emphasis on independent directors also raises several important
questions regarding directors’ ability to effectively perform their oversight
responsibilities. The vast majority of public company directors are independent, which means that they do not have an employment relationship with
the corporation on whose board they serve.179 Recent studies reveal that
most public corporations have only one or two inside directors on their
board.180 While the shift towards increased director independence occurred
because of concerns that boards dominated by insiders would not be effective monitors,181 the shift raises concerns about whether such boards can
perform their oversight responsibilities.
First, the fact that directors are independent increases the likelihood
that they may not be able to devote sufficient time to their duties. Independent directors, by definition, are part-time directors. Recent surveys reveal
that the average director of a public corporation devotes about 192 hours
per year (sixteen hours per month) to board and committee work, including
travel.182 This averages about four hours per week.183 In 1982, when directors worked an average of three hours per week,184 one commentator insisted that “[n]o human being can stay on top of all this in a major company
on a one-and-a-half-day-a-month basis.”185 While the number of hours directors devote to their board work has increased slightly, their responsibili178. SPENCER STUART, 2010 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 27 (2010).
179. See THE KORN/FERRY INST. 34TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 4 (2009) [hereinafter KORN/FERRY STUDY] (noting that in 2007, on average, only two out of ten directors are
full time employees).
180. Id.
181. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence
and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 232 (2002); William B. Chandler III, On
the Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and Institutional Investors, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083,
1084 (1999); Ira M. Millstein, The Evolution of the Certifying Board, 48 BUS. LAW. 1485,
1485–86 (1993).
182. KORN/FERRY STUDY, supra note 179, at 10.
183. See id.
184. See Manning, supra note 165, at 1481.
185. Id.
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ties have risen dramatically, making this sentiment even more appropriate
for today’s director.
Second, directors’ independence raises other critical timing considerations. Independent directors have outside responsibilities, including fulltime jobs. Many corporations have active CEOs or COOs on their board.
Although there has been a steady decline of such directors on public boards,
twenty-four percent of companies have active CEOs or COOs on their
board, while another twenty-one percent of directors are corporate executives, such as division presidents.186 Nearly one-third of audit committee
chairs are either active CEOs or CFOs, while twenty percent of compensation chairs are active CEOs.187 Moreover, only nineteen percent of directors
are retired; the remaining directors are active executives and professionals.188 These statistics show that directors have significant employment obligations outside of the company on whose board they serve. Directors’
active involvement in other matters may provide them with important expertise and experience, but it also raises concerns about their ability to
devote sufficient attention to their board duties. Because directors have fulltime jobs elsewhere, they may not have the time to develop a meaningful
understanding of the challenges facing their corporations.189 Directors’
part-time status not only limits the extent of their interaction with other
directors and management, but also limits the time they can devote to digesting information received from those interactions.190 Hence, independent
directors as monitors create issues for effective oversight.
Third, directors’ independence could prove counter-productive to effective monitoring because of the information they are able to access as
well as the manner in which they access such information. One of the most
important keys to effective oversight is that directors receive unbiased information.191 However, directors are at an informational disadvantage vis-àvis insiders in the corporation.192 Not only does directors’ independent status mean that they inherently have less information than officers and employees, but studies also reveal that directors rarely have channels of
information that are independent from the officers and employees that they
must monitor.193 This may make it difficult for directors to exercise independent judgment and engage in effective monitoring. Without multiple
186. See SPENCER STUART, 2011 BOARD INDEX, supra note 172, at 8.
187. Id. at 30.
188. Id. at 10.
189. See Nicola Faith Sharpe, Process Over Structure: An Organizational Behavior Approach
to Improving Corporate Boards, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 261, 285 (2012).
190. Id. at 290.
191. Id.; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors and Accountants, 63 CAL. L. REV. 375, 404 (1975).
192. Sharpe, supra note 189, at 289.
193. Id.; see also James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering
the Outside Directors with Independent Counsel, 49 VIL. L. REV. 1077, 1082 (2003).
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sources of information, directors are dependent on management to determine how to screen, evaluate, and condense voluminous amounts of information. Even if officers do not actively engage in misconduct, the
information they produce will be skewed towards the management’s perspective. Then too, if the information is tainted, boards may not be in the
best position to notice.
Moreover, it is possible that directors’ independent status may cause
them to inappropriately defer to management in a manner that undermines
their ability to be effective in their oversight role. Studies indicate that when
directors are less confident in their own understanding of corporate affairs,
they unduly rely on managers who they perceive to have greater expertise.194 The size and complexity of the modern corporation, coupled with
the increased time involved with knowing and understanding all of the nuances associated with the corporation, could cause directors to defer to management. Directors’ independence only heightens this deference because it
may prompt directors to assume that managers are better positioned to understand and evaluate corporate affairs. In this regard, directors’ independent status poses a danger that they will inappropriately defer to
management, thereby undermining their ability to serve as effective
monitors.
Finally, the emphasis on independent directors raises questions about
directors’ expertise, which could undermine directors’ ability to be effective
in their oversight role. Even when directors receive information, they must
be able to understand that information, and ask knowledgeable questions if
that information raises concerns about the company and its operations.195
This requires a knowledge and understanding of corporate affairs that many
directors may not have.196 While directors may have knowledge about industry practices more generally, their independent status means that they
will not have in-depth knowledge about the day-to-day affairs of the corporations that they are expected to monitor.197 As a result, directors may not
have the specific expertise necessary to properly evaluate corporate information. To be sure, directors can gain company-specific information
through their work on the board, but this may take years of service.198 Then
too, some studies suggest that the longer directors serve on boards, the more
likely they are to defer to management.199 From this perspective, lengthy
service obviously takes time to establish, but may prove counter-productive
once it is acquired. As a result, it may not be a cure for the lack of expertise
associated with independent directors.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See Fairfax, supra note 10, at 54.
See Arlen, supra note 147, at 344.
Sharpe, supra note 189, at 290.
Id.
Id.
See Fairfax, supra note 10, at 54.
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As this Part reveals, there are important hurdles associated with making directors’ oversight role more robust. Without sufficient appreciation
and consideration of these hurdles, we may be creating expectations about
the oversight doctrine that directors will not be equipped to fulfill.
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The financial crisis caused director oversight to take center stage because it raised concerns about whether directors were effectively performing their duty to actively monitor corporate affairs. The hope is that
enhancing directors’ oversight responsibilities will improve corporate governance and reduce instances of corporate malfeasance. This article questions whether the oversight doctrine offers false hope, creating expectations
that directors cannot realistically fulfill. At the very least, the article argues
that we may need to seriously consider how directors can comply with their
oversight responsibilities in a responsible, but realistic manner. For example, should we limit directors’ oversight to discrete tasks or responsibilities?
Should we consider allowing particular directors with perhaps greater expertise and less outside responsibilities to engage in oversight? Perhaps we
should focus our attention on other agents and advisors in the corporation to
assist with directors’ oversight function.200 Consideration of these and other
questions may be necessary before the potential positive outcomes of an
oversight doctrine can be realized. If that consideration does not occur, then
it is possible that the oversight doctrine will be ineffective, and that our
renewed focus on it will have been a waste of important time and resources.

200. See generally Lyman Johnson & Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers Advised About
Fiduciary Duties?, 64 BUS. LAW. 1105 (2009) (discussing an empirical study regarding whether
and how in-house corporate counsel advise corporate officers about fiduciary duties).

